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ABSTRACT 
This case study provides a review of National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration’s (NASA’s) involvement in system safety during research and 
evolution from air breathing to exo-atmospheric capable flight systems culminating 
in the successful Project Mercury. Although NASA has been philosophically 
committed to the principals of system safety, this case study points out that budget 
and manpower constraints-as well as a variety of internal and external pressures- 
can jeopardize even a well-designed system safety program. This study begins with a 
review of the evolution and early years of NASA’s rise as a project lead agency and 
ends with the lessons learned from Project Mercury. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I05 
The concept of system safety is well known today but there are valuable 
lessons to be learned in examining the historical roadmap of aeronautical 
safety methodologies, specifically system safety programs, which have 
evolved from origins within and around the aviation industry. The value in 
this review is to better understand what programs and processes have been 
successfully employed and more importantly how to preserve the benefits of 
those expensive lessons learned. Hopefully this effort will help to identify 
some of the best practices that have evolved over the past century and 
produce a basis for system safety program managers to emulate in all 
applications. 
METHODOLOGY 
The term case study can have more than one meaning that includes the 
description of a particular organization or a research methodology. 
According to Bramley (1990), it is a “systematic inquiry into an event or a 
set of related events which aims to describe and explain the phenomenon of 
interest” (p. 302). Yin defines the scope of case study research as an 
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context (Yin, 2002). The unit of analysis for this study is the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), specifically the 
early years of the manned space program. This study is focused on an 
exploration and description of NASA’s use of system safety during the early 
years of the man in space program and not in formulating any specific 
proposit ions. 
The Beginning 
The first four decades of powered flight proved that a piecemeal, 
rearview mirror approach to safety is ineffective and expensive. Early 
airplane pioneers such as the Wright Brothers, Samuel P. Langley, Glenn 
Curtiss, and others practiced the fly-fix-fly approach to safety. Although 
aircraft performance improved dramatically during these early years, so too 
did the military accident rate. The U.S. Army Air Service reported in 1921 
“that the Air Service desires to perfect preventive accident measures to the 
fullest possible may be readily appreciated from the fact that during the 
calendar year 1920, 5 1 officers and enlisted men of the Air Service lost their 
lives in airplane accidents, [and] 3 12 airplanes were damaged or destroyed” 
This early expression of concern was soon translated into the first 
practical steps toward a formal accident prevention program. In December 
1925, Major Henry “Hap” Arnold identified the need for a systematic 
approach to aircraft maintenance. Military leadership stressed a systematic 
discipline, which focused on a proactive effort, seeking to identify hazards, 
(P. 25). 
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analyze them for risk, and then to control them as known quantities. The 
focus of this approach is to establish an acceptable level of safety, designed 
into the system as a whole before production or operation. This approach 
then seeks to identify and evaluate hazards before an incident or accident 
causes a loss-anything less is arguably a gamble. The current definition of 
system safety seeks to optimize all aspects of safety within constraints of 
effectiveness, time, and cost throughout all phases of the system life cycle. 
The significance of the emphasis on all phases of the system life cycle will 
become apparent in the following history of NASA. 
An interesting case study presents itself while examining these early 
years of system safety practice. The marked contrast between what was 
available and what was employed, in terms of system safety management 
and engineering, is so striking that it calls for a more in- depth look. As with 
any program, gaining acceptance and support with subsequent 
administrations almost always requires an effort to convince the new 
management team that the old management team knew what they were 
doing. Egos and narcissism are plentiful in the aviation industry; the 
humorous quip, “You can tell a pilot - you just can’t tell him much” is true 
even among those who manage pilots, and the systems they fly. 
NACA History 
In the 1920s and 1930s, the National Advisory Committee for 
Aeronautics (NACA) was demonstrating worldwide leadership in 
aeronautical sciences. They concentrated their research in aerodynamics and 
aerodynamic loads, with lesser attention to sub-systems and components 
such as structures and power plants. During this era, NACA worked closely 
with the military services in joint projects that were its contractual lifeblood. 
Even as late as 1939, NACA was a relatively small organization with an 
annual budget of $4.6 million and a total workforce of approximately 500 
people, of which slightly over one-half were researchers (Swenson, 
Grimwood, & Alexander, 1966). 
In 1941, Jerome C. Hunsaker, head of the Department of Aeronautical 
Engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and a 
member of the Main Committee of NACA, assumed the NACA 
chairmanship. As the U.S. geared its industrial might for war, NACA 
watched as Germany and the United Kingdom led aviation in areas such as 
jet propulsion and high-speed flight. Going into the war years, the majority 
of NACA’s research effort was oriented toward improving current designs or 
quick fixes to military aircraft already in production (Hunsaker, 1956). This 
organizational culture would follow NACA into the next decade. 
After the close of WW 11, the cold-war years continued to place 
demands for research, acquisition, and the fielding of new systems. 
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By 1946, NACA had grown to approximately 6,800 personnel with an annual budget 
of $40 million. Chairman Hunsaker and others on the Main Committee felt that 
NACA’s principal mission should be research into the fundamentals of aeronautics, 
however, the aircraft industry continued to rely on NACA as a problem-solving 
agency. The pressure and culture for quick fixes prevailed within the agency as the 
United States entered the conflict in Korea-war justified the need for expediency in 
solving various performance challenges and resulting system problems. (Hunsaker, 
1956, pp. 267-268) 
Closer inspection reveals that at this time in aviation industry’s history, 
the valuable lessons learned in the previous decade had not proliferated 
broadly into the overall aviation industry culture. 
The windfall discovery of extensive German aeronautical research 
programs after WW I1 compelled both the Army Air Force (AAF) and 
NACA to propose airplane research programs to Congress. For the AAF, 
struggling to achieve independence from the U.S. Army, the proposed new 
role was founded on justification that no other agency could do its flight 
research and development. The AAF’s safety program development since the 
earliest days of aviation lends credibility to that position. The mission was 
also a logical one for NACA as an extension of the research roles they had 
established in aeronautical systems development. 
In 1946, a team was assembled at Muroc Army Air Field, California 
[present day Edwards Air Force Base (AFB)] to begin the effort between the 
AAF, NACA, and research project manufacturer Bell Aircraft. Major 
General Albert Boyd, commander of Wright Field Flight Test Division and 
later the Flight Test Unit at Edwards AFB, reflecting on the success of  the 
X-1 research vehicle, said of the accomplishment, “[This work stands] as a 
monumental tribute to both the USAF and the NACA, since the sonic barrier 
monster was not only completely licked, but a blow-by-blow account of its 
defeat was recorded for future use” (Air Force-NACA Conference, 1948). 
President Harry S. Truman recognized the partnership’s 
accomplishments and presented the Collier Trophy for significant 
contributions in aerospace research to United States Air Force (USAF) 
Captain Chuck Yeager, Mr. Larry Bell of Bell Aircraft, and John Stack of 
NACA. 
The methodologies employed during the research conducted at Edwards 
AFB, including the work of the U.S. Navy (USN) and NACA on the 
Douglas Aircraft Company D-558, affected the designs of future military 
aircraft, which profited from the system acquisition approach employed by 
the military services. Follow-on tests of improved versions of the X-1 and a 
new design, the X-2, methodically tested the outer regions of supersonic 
flight in an effort to better understand hypersonic flight, which had to  be 
mastered to escape the bounds of earth. Proven designs found their way into 
future aircraft systems. More reliable systems translated to lower mishap 
rates and by the early 1950s the entire aviation industry (commercial and 
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military) were profiting from this research. Incorporating a proven 
acquisition process with system safety engineering at the basis, the military 
services and NACA were moving forward on a new experimental aircraft 
that would employ a rocket propulsion system capable of flying to nearly 
400,000 feet-the upper boundaries of the atmosphere where the traditional 
knowledge of aerodynamics were almost unrecognizable (Swenson et al., 
1996) 
The assault that took place on the upper regions of the atmosphere was 
arguably second only to the Wright Brothers conquering of sustained flight 
just 50 years previous. In 1952, Robert Woods of Bell Aircraft Corporation 
began efforts to promote manned space flight by urging the U.S. to analyze 
the basic problems of space flight. He further recommended research into a 
suitable test vehicle for space flight. Unfortunately, the urgency and 
resources for such an endeavor were simply not available at that time. 
By March 1954, however, the combined efforts of the USAF, USN and 
NACA’s laboratories at Langley, Ames, and the High Speed Flight Station at 
Edwards AFB produced contracts to study the concept and ready the studies 
for hypersonic flight. Using a cradle-to-grave approach, the first feasibility 
studies were used to identify all major hazards in detail and initiate means to 
either eliminate or reduce the severity of those known threats. Recognizing 
there were regions of flight that could not be duplicated in wind tunnels, the 
test program established goals that recognized materials and technology 
limitations, while leaving enough flexibility to modify the program as they 
discovered new facts. NACA Langley requested that boundaries to the 
development be established, calling for a flight research tool to be used to 
obtain the maximum amount of data for the development of follow-on 
systems in a three-year time limit. This was a brute force effort on its part to 
obtain flight information as soon as possible (Stillwell, 1964). 
History highlights a culture of expediency pervading within NACA and 
its successor NASA. This could be as a result of the motivating factors 
during WW I1 and the Korean War that provided contracts to NACA for 
quick fixes. Additionally, their use of unmanned test vehicles launched to 
gather test points had been successful but lacked the motivation or oversight 
of those who manage human lives. In the interest of time, higher risks can be 
accepted during unmanned test flights in a fly-fix-fly approach to testing, 
however the paradigm might be a difficult one to break when attempting to 
reduce the overall system risk in later human endeavors. Clearly, NACA’s 
focus was test data. 
It is difficult to prove, but certainly noteworthy, that it appears the 
NACA research engineers were willing to accept more risk than those who 
would fly the aircraft. In the design of the X- 15, NACA: 
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Emphasized that the airplane should not become encumhered with systems or 
components not essential to flight research. These requirements were tempered by 
knowledge that a three-year development schedule would leave little or no time to 
perfect systems and subsystems before first flight. (Stillwell, 1964, p. 3) 
With Department of Defense (DoD) oversight, a Memorandum of 
Understanding was signed between the military services and NACA 
establishing guidelines for the program, with lines of authority and control. 
Establishing these fundamental understandings among the various agencies 
“had no small effect on the successful pursuit of the research. In essence, it 
states briefly that each partner agrees to carry out the task it is best qualified 
for” (Stillwell, 1964, p. 5). 
The USAF Aeronautical Systems Division (formerly the Wright Air 
Development Center) provided a shepherding role during concept 
development. In December 1954, an agreement between the military services 
and NACA was accepted with operational arrangements similar to those in 
the X-1 and other experimental flight tests conducted at Edwards AFB. The 
USAF was responsible for finding a contractor and supervising design and 
construction; both the USAF and the USN would fund the project. 
Technical direction would come from NACA. 
The Los Angeles Division of North American Aviation, Inc. (NAA) 
won the design based on past performance and safety records. (NAA had 
already demonstrated system safety approaches in development of other 
systems and Los Angeles was the aerospace Mecca of system safety 
engineers.) Although NACA studies had possible solutions for major 
technological concerns, the basic challenge of how to build an airplane 
capable of Mach 6 speeds flying to 250,000 feet was not precisely defined 
and iiie aerodynamic information necessary was incomplete or simply not 
available. Throughout this phase, the DoD program managers were 
continually forced to provide a reconciliation of differing viewpoints as each 
partner in the project had different objectives. The X-15 was to become the 
product of one year of study, one year of design and one year of 
construction. These types of broad milestones are frequently used in the 
early phase of system safety planning groups. 
The preliminary hazard identification effort during the design concept 
phase did not limit safety concerns to only the X-15 pilot. The potential 
danger to the B-52 crew (stage 1 propulsion system) also had to be 
considered, as an explosion of the X-15 during separation and initiation of 
self-powered flight could be a serious threat to the launch vehicle. For this 
reason, safe operation of the X-15 (stage 2 propulsion systems) became a 
primary objective. Reaction Motors Inc. (soon to become a division of the 
Thiokol Chemical Corporation) was chosen for the task. Reaction Motors 
had designed and built many rocket engines for X-series research projects 
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and, in over 384 flights, had never had a catastrophic engine failure. The 
technical specifications for the X- 15's XLR-99 engine outlined that: 
Any single malfunction in either engine or propulsion system should not create a 
condition which would be hazardous to the pilot. [Engineers set about an exacting 
design philosophy] ... endeavoring to prevent malfunctions ... [by designing] the 
engine so that the conditions following any malfunctions would be controlled before 
they became hazardous. (Stillwell, 1964, p. 5 )  
The result of these efforts was a 96% reliability rate, a figure that 
shames other missile engines in this era. This is the essence of system safety 
philosophy in the concept and design phases, clearly demonstrating its 
practice within the military services, NAA, and the rocket motor division of 
the Thiokol Corporation in 1954. 
A vibrant product improvement and development program continued 
throughout the operational life cycle of the X-15. In 1956 the aerodynamic 
design was established, while NAA pushed the limits of available materials 
with heat resistant Inconel-X to complete the structural design. In 1958 the 
introduction of new fabrication techniques happened, while the 
development-test program during the years 1959 to 1964 produced many 
examples of product improvement during the operational phase of use. 
Using a system approach to design and acquisition does not guarantee a 
risk-free program without unexpected surprises. However, the frequency, 
severity, and total cost of such an event should be a calculated risk-not a 
gamble-accepted by someone at the appropriate level of decision making. 
The X-15 project had a few surprises. One aircraft broke in half on landing. 
A more spectacular event occurred during ground tests of the XLR-99 
engine when the engine violently exploded due to a sub-component failure. 
This mishap would most certainly have cost test pilot Scott Crossfield his 
life had this occurred in-flight, however the controlled environment in which 
the test was conducted (land based) combined with the cockpit design, 
aircraft structure, and the life support systems built into the design allowed 
him to survive (Stillwell, 1964). 
The flight test program progressed from flight to flight on foundations 
of discovery. Since testing involved venturing into the unknown, operational 
considerations required an answer to every possible issue. What-if questions 
involved many man-hours of fault tree analysis before allowing a pilot to 
potentially face such a critical event in flight. Analog and then digital 
computers were used to simulate flights on the ground, thus allowing pilots 
and engineers to work literally side by side as they test-flew a mission on the 
ground before any actual flight attempt. The operational margin of safety 
was the governing issue of the program. Each flight became an extrapolation 
of previous experience to more stringent parameters. 
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The significant accomplishments of the X-15 program are often 
compared to those of the unmanned efforts in space exploration during this 
era. The advantages or disadvantages of human versus automated machine 
are often at the center of the debate and continue to this day. However, the 
success rate at achieving research objectives over a five-year period, 
covering 120 flights with a 92% mission success rate certainly speaks highly 
of the reliability designed into the X-15 program. Was it the man in the 
cockpit or the men on the ground and the value they placed in human life 
aboard the research vehicle that contributed to the success of this project? 
Did the fact that the Flight Controller, responsible for the coordination and 
control of the complete mission, and one of the experienced test pilots, 
insure the tough issues were resolved with an err toward conservativeness? 
How were these conflicting positions resolved when the cultural differences 
between the various organizations represented in the research project 
gridlocked in a heated debate? Were system safety processes responsible for 
the differences noted between this and other programs outside of DoD 
management? These and other behind-the-scenes issues are outside the scope 
of this study; however, the strong commitment to safety of those in 
leadership positions far outweigh less formal processes left to resolve 
differences on their own. Clear-cut guidance from above is essential when 
the tough questions surface, as they inevitably do. 
The successes of the X-planes programs, managed by the collaborative 
effort of the military services and employing system safety processes, even 
though it was still an evolving process, boosted the prestige of NACA as a 
research agency. The reputation for thorough aeronautical research that 
NACA quietly built in the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s continued 
to grow until the organization transformed into a new space agency, almost 
evemight, when President Eisenhower sigiied the Space Act on Jiiiy 29, 
1958 (National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958). 
USAF Leadership into Space 
The X- 15 operated in what was termed the near-space equivalent. (Its 
pilots wore astronaut wings and dealt with re-entry issues much more 
demanding than a capsule re-entry from space into the earth’s atmosphere.). 
However, the expediency felt by some to simply place a man into orbit 
around the earth compelled research engineers to seek other solutions to the 
goal as winged craft were taking too much time to accomplish that objective. 
In one camp, aerodynamicists were working on a hypersonic research 
aircraft with delta wings to handle the heat of atmospheric re-entry using a 
program managed by the USAF. The other camp was reviewing how to 
quickly modify an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) launch vehicle 
(also managed by the USAF) to propel a ballistic capsule system, 
irreverently referred to as man in a can, into low Earth orbit. The capsule 
method was nothing more than an extension of re-entry vehicles used in the 
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development of ICBMs. The limiting factor for adding a man was payload 
capabilities of existing launch vehicles and the weight of the capsule with its 
life support systems. Reliable missile technology did not currently exist with 
an ability to lift the heavier (winged) hypersonic-glide vehicle into orbit. For 
this reason, industrial firms were mainly investigating the ballistic capsule 
option as the quickest solution to orbiting a manned vehicle even though 
winged craft were already operationally testing the lower regions of space. In 
late 1956, NACA agreed in principle with the USAF Air Research 
Development Command (ARDC) to cooperate on the manned glide rocket 
research system. By January 1957, the NACA Ames group reported 
conclusions that a rocket-powered vehicle for efficient hypersonic flight was 
feasible. A minority report from a NACA Langley aerodynamicist in the 
Flight Research Instrument Research and Pilotless Aircraft Research 
Division (PARD), recommended a spherical capsule be considered for global 
flight before a glide rocket. There was little interest expressed in work on 
this proposal within the main body of NACA at this time (Swenson et al., 
1966). 
NACA study groups continued the investigation of manned glide rocket 
concepts. A 1957 study on the Preliminary Investigation of a New Research 
Airplane for Exploring the Problems of Efficient Hypersonic Flight (NACA) 
supported a raised-top, flat-bottom glider configuration. Soon thereafter, on 
October 4, 1957, the opening bell of the space race sounded. The U.S.S.R. 
had launched a satellite into earth’s orbit and altered our nation’s altitude 
about space exploration. 
Even though the official position of the Eisenhower Administration was 
a no race policy, a new urgency was adopted and efforts to expedite space 
exploration were accelerated. On October 15, 1957, representatives from the 
various NACA laboratories met at the Ames center in an effort to resolve 
conflicts in aerodynamic thinking. Dubbed the Round Three Conference, the 
meeting produced the fundamental concept for the X-20 project. A small 
contingent returned to Langley convinced that maximum concentration of 
effort to achieve manned orbital flight as quickly as possible meant use of 
the ballistic-capsule approach. Dr. Maxime A. Faget, speaking to the entire 
conference, declared that NACA had misplaced its research emphasis on the 
hypersonic-glide option and should work on orbiting a man as fast as 
possible (Swenson et al., 1966). 
In December 1957, Lieutenant General Donald L. Putt, USAF Deputy 
Chief of Staff for Development, moved to establish a directorate-level 
program for aeronautics within the USAF. The effort was quickly opposed 
by the Secretary of Defense, who was not supportive of any military services 
venturing into astronautics despite their ongoing research efforts. The newly 
appointed DoD Director of Guided Missiles accused the USAF with trying 
to grab the limelight and establish a position. It is interesting to note the 
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Secretary of Defense, a political appointee of President and retired General 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, would fail to recognize the value added from the 
DoD’s own acquisition program and chide the USAF for continuing to do 
what President Truman had spoken so highly of in the effort to break the 
sound barrier. It appears the politics of space exploration had overridden 
common sense. 
The directorate idea was shelved and USAF Headquarters (HQ) ordered 
the ARDC to prepare a comprehensive review of the astronautics program, 
including estimates of funding and space technology projections over the 
next five years. ARDC had already been working on a 15-year plan for 
USAF research and development in astronautics and quickly reduced its 
finding down to a 5-year plan. General Putt wrote to NACA Director Hugh 
L. Dryden on January 3 1, 1958, formally inviting NACA to participate with 
the USAF in both the boost-glide research airplane (the Dyna-Soar) and a 
manned one-orbit flight in a vehicle capable only of a satellite orbit. 
Dryden informed General Putt that NACA was working on their design for a manned 
space capsule and would “coordinate” with the USAF later when they completed 
their studies. By this date. NACA had already developed its own goals of managing 
manned space exploration and was beginning to spread its wings. (Swenson et al., 
1966, p. 74) 
Behind the scenes, NACA HQ administrators saw an opportunity for the 
agency to broaden their activities by moving into astronautics. Some 
managers within NACA wanted to leave behind its principal role in research 
projects and expand into system development and flight operations, despite 
having only been a participant in such programs with no managing 
experience. Seeking a leadership role in the uncertain world of contracts, 
fii!!-sca!e flight operations and puS!ic i ~ l a t i c ~ ~ ,  NACA fixed their sights oii a 
broad-based national space program with a principal objective to 
demonstrate the practicality of manned space flight. During the ten months 
between the first Sputnik launch and the establishment of a manned space 
program under a newly designated agency, NACA leadership continued to 
ensure their current role in traditional research and consultation while at the 
same time unleashing an ambitious team of engineers scattered throughout 
the NACA establishment to allow themselves to take a dominant role in the 
nation’s new objective in space (Swenson et al., 1966). The DoD was slowly 
abdicating its ability to positively influence the nation’s space efforts. At 
least five years of successful system safety management was soon to be 
pushed aside as project management of space exploration was handed over 
to a new entrant into the big leagues of government contracts, public 
relations and Congressional oversight. 
President Eisenhower’s stated U.S. policy held that space activities 
should be conducted solely for peaceful purposes. The objectives of guided 
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missile projects of the time reflected this policy. In a letter to Soviet Premie] 
Nikolai Bulganin, dated January 12, 1958, the President stated; 
Outer space should be used only for peaceful purposes ... Can we not stop the 
production of such weapons which would use or, more accurately, misuse, outer 
space, now for the first time opening up as a field for man’s exploration? Should not 
outer space be dedicated to the peaceful uses of mankind and denied to the purposes 
of war? (Eisenhower letter to Nikolai Bulganin, 1958) 
By April 1958, members of Congress would introduce a total of 29 bill5 
and resolutions calling for re-organization of the nation’s space efforts. Thc 
Senate Preparedness Investigating Committee under Senator Lyndon B 
Johnson summarized its findings with recommendations to establish ar 
independent space agency. During these times of transition, the militarq 
services dutifully continued their planning of space programs using prover 
system acquisition practices in the hope of securing their role in future space 
programs and with the knowledge that a newly formed organization woulc 
take several months if not years to take the reigns currently held by the 
various research program managers within the armed services. 
NACA Covets a Leadership Role 
Consistent with Eisenhower’s peaceful space policy, the Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the DoD had been used as an interim 
oversight agency pending establishment of a new civilian-controlled 
aerospace management organization. Top-level management of these 
programs shifted from the DoD to a completely new organization in shorl 
order. President Eisenhower ordered an 18-member Presidential Scientific 
Advisory Committee (PSAC), chaired by James R. Killian, Jr., President oi 
MIT, for advice on these matters. Eisenhower’s directions to this committee 
were to draw up two documents: (a) a broad policy statement justifying 
government-financed astronautical ventures and (b) a recommendation for 
organizing a national space program. The early PSAC work was dubbed the 
Killian Committee and was divided into two subcommittees. One 
subcommittee was charged to develop policy and was headed by Edward H. 
Purcell, a physicist and executive vice-president of Bell Telephone 
Laboratories; the other subcommittee developed an organizational structure 
and was led by Harvard University physicist James B. Fisk. (Swenson et al.? 
1966). 
Two physicists, one a corporate leader and the other an academic, 
developed the policy and organizational structure of a neophyte flight 
research, development, and operations organization charged with conquering 
this new flight environment called space. The organizational work was 
completed first and the subcommittee produced a crucial report to the PSAC 
in February 1958. A new agency built around NACA would be created to 
manage a comprehensive national program in astronautics, emphasizing 
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peaceful, civilian-controlled research and development. The PSAC report, 
titled Introduction to Outer Space, was published in March, and stated, “the 
compelling urge of man to explore and to discover, the defense objective, 
national prestige, and new opportunities for scientific observation and 
experiment are four factors which give importance, urgency, and 
inevitability to the advancement of space technology” (PSAC, 1958, p. 2). 
The President’s intense conviction that space should be primarily 
reserved for scientific exploration, not military exploitation, called for the 
establishment of a “National Aeronautical and Space Agency.. .which would 
absorb NACA and assume responsibility for all space activities ... except ... 
those projects primarily associated with military requirements” (Swenson et 
al., 1966, p. 84). A single executive and a 17-member advisory board called 
for extension of the NACA Main Committee concept with a centralized 
authority that would “have not only research but development, managerial, 
and flight operational responsibilities” (Swenson et al., 1966, p. 83). This 
was a significant executive decision that launched a loosely woven group of 
research scientists and engineers into a national agency, unlike its NACA 
predecessor, with extensive authority for contracting research and 
development projects. The USAF and USN lost management control of the 
research programs into outer space and would take a subordinate advisory or 
support role in non-atmospheric flight operations. Would the valuable 
experience in flight test and research program management be transferred as 
well? 
NACA’s Focus 
In addition to their contract work to date, engineers at all NACA 
installations had been stepping up research in materials and aerodynamics 
preparing for large-scale development and operational activities. The 
primary purpose of NACA’s work to this point in its history had always been 
to improve the performance of piloted aircraft. Different philosophies existed 
within the various NACA labs and not everyone was convinced that the 
agency’s best interests lay in managing programs and carrying out satellite 
launching. Many of the more focused research engineers endorsed the 
official NACA HQ position that, “with respect to space it neither wanted not 
expected more than its historic niche in government-financed science and 
engineering. ..it should remain essentially a producer of data for use by 
others” (Swenson et al., 1966, p. 77). The prevailing attitude within the 
Ames Research Center about the prospect of managing programs was 
exceedingly distasteful. The Ames engineers enjoyed the quasi-academic 
focus on research, the outside-of-the-box thinking it was noted for and the 
freedom from political pressures. This same attitude did not exist at the other 
two labs or at the High Speed Flight Station at Edwards AFB. The years of 
direct participation with USAFAJSN and research aircraft manufacturers 
provided Walter Williams and his staff at the Flight Station a rather clear 
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operational orientation. The NACA Lewis and Langley staffs apparently 
understood the magnitude of the effort, but seemingly minimized it as they 
only stated it would be quite a challenge to manage a program versus simply 
advising the military or industrial providers. Most of NACA did approve of 
the scientific measures provided by President Eisenhower to Congress 
espousing their ideas. 
In the various NACA Flight Research facilities at Langley, Wallops 
Island, and Lewis, there were engineers who had experience in operational 
issues while developing airfoils, however, they had always turned those 
research findings over to DoD management. Now, enticed by the prospect of 
national prominence, vast amounts of government funding, and the surge of 
emotions delivered by the Soviet’s first-in-space achievements, it is easily 
recognizable why an ambitious group of research engineers seized the 
opportunity to put their expertise to work. 
Man in a Can Prevails 
In the months following the Soviet satellite launchings, NACA’s 
attention to spacecraft design accelerated as they realized their nose-cone 
research for ICBMs was applicable and transferable to manned vehicles as 
well. While still working with the USAF on plans for a manned orbital 
project in March 1958, they had in fact been given official sanction to 
provide work they had already been accomplishing. Thus the Langley 
engineers had found a clever way to perform early development work for 
their own ambitious enterprise-Project Mercury. 
The primary advocate behind much of this activity was Dr. Faget, head 
of the Performance Aerodynamics Branch in PARD, who embodied the 
traditional Langley research culture that preferred to test aerodynamic 
theories on instrumented free-flight vehicles versus wind tunnel testing. Dr. 
Faget was on record favoring the quickest solution to space, the capsule 
option, while NACA Ames was avidly pushing the semi-lifting body 
concept, without the responsibility to build the vehicle or manage the 
program. 
The choice between the semi-lifting configuration (X-20 concept) 
favored by the Ames group and the capsule device really was an academic 
one to supporters of the capsule option. Accepting the assumption that a 
manned satellite should be placed into low-earth orbit as quickly as possible, 
the Atlas ICBM would have to serve as the launch vehicle for the relatively 
lighter capsule. The Atlas ICBM was undergoing a rigorous systematic 
review toward status as a reliable rocket (per military specifications) and it 
was the only launch vehicle near operational readiness. These questionable 
caveats limit the choices and build a paradigm around the option, which 
allegedly uses the simplest, quickest, and most dependable approach-ruling 
out the heavier, semi-lifting vehicle that would have required adding an extra 
stage to the Atlas rocket. Interestingly enough, Faget did not have detailed 
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data on the Atlas’ design performance; such information was highly 
classified and he lacked clearance. 
While the engineers at NACA accelerated their designs, tests, and plans, 
and Congress received Eisenhower’s space bill, the organizational 
transformation of NACA began. After the White House Advisory Committee 
on Government Organization recommended that a national civilian space 
program be built around NACA, Director Dryden and his subordinates in 
Washington began planning the revamping that would have to accompany 
the reorientation of NACA functions. On April 2, 1958, as part of his space 
message to Congress, Eisenhower instructed NACA and the DoD to review 
the projects then under ARPA to determine which should be transferred to 
the new civilian space agency (NASA, n.d.). 
NACA and DoD representatives, in consultation with Bureau of the 
Budget officials, reached tentative agreements on the disposition of 
practically all the projects and facilities in question, with the notable 
exception of manned space flight. In accordance with Eisenhower’s directive 
that NACA “describe the internal organization, management structure, staff, 
facilities, and funds which will be required (Rosholt, 1966, p. 8), NACA set 
up an ad hoc committee on organization. The Space Act additionally called 
for a civilian-military liaison, appointed by the President, to ensure “full 
interchange of information and data acquired in NASA and Defense 
Department programs” (Swenson et ai., 1966, p. 98). 
The U.S. military systems management experiences of the past decade 
would not make the transition. The handoff from DoD management of flight 
research, especially in the area of system acquisition and safety, to the new 
national space exploration agency was not going to be a clean one. 
Ambitious research engineers, dividing their attention between their 
11 ~ U I L ~ O I I ~ I  I UICS iii support of goveiiiinent pi ojeeis atid ioiai tnatiageiiietit of 
their new enterprise, essentially failed to capture valuable lessons learned by 
the USAF and USN management of the activities at Edwards AFB. Political 
pressures within NASA to fulfill this new destiny forced many of those 
dissenting opinions to join the team that was now taking control of a 
program in support of a national objective. The pressure to think as the group 
thought must have been tremendous for those researchers and engineers who 
had been educated in the school of hard-knocks at the various military test 
facilities over the last decade. This was certainly not the last time that group- 
think would become problematic for the space agency. 
Quantitative System Safety Programs 
In 1958 while NACA engineers were maneuvering to take over research 
and development as the lead organization in the space race, the USAF was 
pressing ahead with the successful acquisition programs that had been 
evolving for the past five decades. The first quantitative system safety 
analysis effort to address hazard prevention in new designs was initiated 
*..-A:* - - l  ..-I-.. 
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with the X-20 Dyna-Soar program. Due to its design criteria to fly beyond 
the atmosphere, the X-20 was recognized to have unique emergency, rescue, 
and survival problems. Fulfilling a safety objective that states each person 
should be allowed to live and work under conditions in which hazards are 
known and controlled to an acceptable level of potential harm, system safety 
pioneers such as USAF Colonel George Ruff, of the Ballistics System 
Division, participated in initiating the first system safety programs required 
of prime contractors. (Roland & Moriarty, 1983) Unfortunately, NACA 
management did not learn this during their operational exposure at Edwards 
AFB. Predictably it was not transferred to their follow-on agency, NASA. 
While safety experts struggled with hazards, politicians dealt with their 
own threats-the budget. That same year, the USAF attempted to invite 
NACA to join them in the man in space program on either the boost-glide 
(X-20) or the manned capsule (Mercury) projects. Director Hugh Dryden 
signed a formal agreement on the boost-glide research while rejecting the 
offer to join in the capsule option, as they were working on their own 
designs. This somewhat disingenuous act was self-serving for NACA, and 
readily points to how the X-20 program was overcome by politics and 
leapfrogging national priorities. Without doubt, the X-20 program would 
have escorted system safety concepts into the exploration of outer space, just 
like those ballistic missile programs managed by DoD. The budget for the X- 
20 was restricted. Funding waned as the nation embraced the man in a can 
approach. Ultimately, in December 1963 Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara canceled the project and a majority of USAFKJSN participation 
in the exploration of space (Swenson et al., 1966). 
The military services never abandoned their commitment to system 
safety, and continued to use a system approach as ballistic missile 
development pressed ahead during the late 1950s and early 1960s. In July 
1960, a system safety office was established at the USAF Ballistic Missile 
Division in Inglewood, California. In April of that year, the USAF had 
published the first system-wide safety specification titled BSD Exhibit 62-4 1 
(Stephenson, 1991). The Naval Aviation Safety Center was the first to 
become active in promoting an inter-service system safety specification for 
aircraft, using BSD Exhibit 62-41 as a model. By 1962, system safety was 
identified as a contract deliverable item on military contracts and that same 
year Roger Lockwood held organizational meetings in the Los Angeles area 
of what would become the System Safety Society-a professional 
organization incorporated as an international, non-profit organization 
dedicated to the safety of systems, products, and services. (Stephenson, 
1991). By 1964, The University of Southern California had developed a 
Master’s degree program to support industry demands for these specialties. 
BSD Exhibit 62-41 was broadened in September 1963, as MIL-S-38130, 
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which in 1969 became the model for MIL-STD-882, a standard that has been 
updated over the years and exists today (USAF, 2000). 
Project Management by Trial and Error 
The rapid growth of NASA from a research-support agency to that of 
primary agency and program management for space exploration points to a 
hazard in itself and offers hindsight into the executive decision to make such 
a bold move. Almost certainly there was no intent to abandon the successful 
programs and relationships forged by the USAFIUSN and even NACA, but 
the reality of politics is that once you lose control of the purse strings you 
often lose input to the direction of a program. Almost immediately 
discussions between the managing NASA agency and the manufacturer of 
various components of the ballistic capsule option highlight the lack of 
understanding and commitment, from the top down, to maintain previously 
established DoD relationships with the contractors. Debates of semantics 
broke out and a numbers game was tagged to some of the developmental 
efforts to quantify various engineering decisions. Some complained that 
reliability was a slippery word, suggesting more than could be proven. Of 
course in other endeavors, including aviation and missile acquisition, it had 
already achieved a recognized discipline as an engineering practice 
In mid-1959, well after design and development work on major systems 
of the Mercury capsule were well under way, a search for a means of 
predicting failures and increasing reliability was modestly undertaken by 
NASA’s Space Task Group (STG) and McDonnell Aircraft Corporation 
(MAC) engineers. This paradigm was consistent among other groups 
working in support, which also had not used formal processes to achieve 
quality control in various systems and sub-systems. “Mathematical analyses 
of the word reliability both clarified its operational meaning and stirred 
resistance to [a] statistical approach to quality control” (Swenson et al., 
1966, p. 178). 
Aviation research and development in the 1950s had witnessed a 
remarkable growth in the application of statistical quality control to ensure 
the reliability of various systems. The science of operations analysis and the 
art of quality had emerged by the end of the 1950s as special vocations. 
Amazingly, in what can only be viewed as a narcissistic not-invented-here 
attitude, STG executive engineers overlooked DoD examples and studied 
new methods for more scientific management of efficiency provided by the 
automobile industry. 
By 1959, when it was finally decided to organize engineering design 
information and data on component performance, the definition of critical 
parts had to be established. The STG and MAC worked to create that 
definition while analysis suffered. NASA HQ sought outside help and USAF 
systems engineers were used. They pointed to certain semantic problems in 
the primitive concepts being used for reliability analyses by NASA. 
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Amazingly, some of the debates centered on questions such as, what 
constitutes a system, and how should we define failure. An indication of a 
more mature process was the question, what indices or coefficients best 
measure overall system performance from subsystem data (Swenson et al., 
1966, p. 179). 
Indications of the level of resistance to these proven methodologies were 
the positions taken by some creative engineers who felt the features of 
reliability prediction were so subjective that many seriously questioned the 
validity and even the reliability of reliability predictions. One apologist in 
this field admitted, “Reliability engineering may seem to be more mysticism 
and black art than ... down-to-earth engineering. In particular, many 
engineers look on reliability prediction as a kind of space-age astrology in 
which failure rate tables have been substituted for the zodiac” (Swenson et 
al., 1966, p. 179). 
Although a skeptical attitude did exist within STG, newly arrived 
Associate Administrator Richard E. Homer brought a staff of 
mathematicians and statisticians led by Nicholas E. Golovin, who transferred 
from the USAF to NASA some of the mathematical techniques lending 
quantitative support to demands for qualitative assurance. NASA HQ and the 
Langley laboratory worked at cross-purposes for nearly a year as reliability 
and safety were debated. NASA HQ worked aggressively to align the STG 
and MAC worked to change their methods. Increasing the level of reliability 
became a major goal during testing in 1960. 
Sorting Wheat from Chaff 
Statisticians, and actuaries, working with large and statistically 
significant amounts of data, have long been able to achieve excellent 
predictions (as witnessed in the insurance industry’s successes) by defining 
reliability as probability. However, this has never provided the ability to 
predict what would happen in a specific instance. STG and MAC managers 
working a specific system or project ridiculed probability theory and 
continued to reference the numbers game, failing to accept the statistical 
value of such efforts. They felt that reliability could be demonstrated as 
ability. Harry Powell, the senior statistician at Space Technology 
Laboratories for the Atlas weapon system, elaborated on this debate while 
man-rating the Atlas rocket. 
If reliability is to be truly understood and controlled, then it must be thought of as a 
device, a physical property which behaves in accordance with certain physical laws. 
In order to insure that a device will have these physical properties it is necessary to 
consider it first as a design parameter. In other words, reliability is a property of the 
equipment, which must be designed into the equipment by the engineers. Reliability 
cannot be tested into a device and it cannot be inspected into a device; it can only be 
achieved if it is first designed into a device. Most design engineers are acutely aware 
that they are under several obligations-to meet schedules, to design their equipment 
with certain space and weight limitations, and to create a black box (a subsystem) 
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uhich will give certain outputs when certain inputs are fed into it. It is imperative 
that they also be aware of their obligation to design a device which will in fact 
perform its required function under operation conditions whenever it is called upon 
to do so. (Swenson et al., 1966, p.180) 
A generally accepted standard in probability theory states the reliability 
of a system is exactly equal to the product of the reliability of each of its 
subsystems in series. The obvious way to mitigate risk (a hazard with 
measured probability multiplied by severity) is to place two mission critical 
components in parallel to perform the same function. If one system fails, the 
other assumes the critical function. Redundancy is a favored technique used 
to ensure reliability. 
The MAC production of the Mercury capsule was taking longer to build 
than forecast primarily as a result of limited system integration within the 
project. Fuzzy lines of authority and communications without the benefit of 
the sharing of intelligence across organizational lines of reporting among the 
various activities involved in the program were hindering an efficient 
process. Even with these strong indicators of a flawed acquisition 
management style, STG and MAC felt the basic dispute over safety versus 
success, or positive versus negative redundancy, could be settled only with 
actual flight test experience, that is, a fly-fix-fly approach. 
A precaution for safety program managers is highlighted by this 
historical event. Even though safety programs are in place, a lack of 
standardization and commonality of purpose among line organizations will 
result in non-effective monitoring, evaluation, and eventually loss of control 
in safety efforts throughout an organization. 
As Project Mercury matured, the costs of solutions to technological and 
training problems rose. NASA administrators appeared frequently before 
~ ~ ~ ~ 5 ~ & u ~ ~ a ~  vvcI&ut committees and admitted their growing concern 
with manned space flight, as opposed to other space activities. T. K. Glennan 
requested a supplemental $23 million appropriation to the fiscal year 1960 
NASA budget of $500.6 million and justified $19 million of that extra sum 
on the basis of the urgent technological demands of Project Mercury. “It 
would be no exaggeration to say that the immediate focus of the U S .  space 
program is upon this project” (Swenson et al., 1966, p. 1 SO), stated Glennan, 
waving the national objective in front of those with the purse strings in hand. 
In February 1960, at NASA HQ in Washington, a high-level debate over 
the meticulous versus the statistical approach to reliability was vigorously 
discussed between NASA HQ, STG, and MAC representatives. They met in 
conference to decide what weight to give the numbers game in a frank and 
confidential estimate of readiness. The Chief of Reliability, John C. French, 
defended STG’s practical procedures against the theoretical approach of 
NASA HQ’s Nicholas E. Golovin. Eugene Kunznick also outlined the 
particulars of the prime contractor’s quality control measures, and delivered 
pnnnror .A- - - . - - - - - I -  
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the third revision of MAC’s reliability program. Walter Williams presented 
STG’s latest views on operational flight safety, and STG generally endorsed 
MAC’s reliability program review as its own. At the conclusion of the 
meeting, NASA HQ was not convinced with the efforts taken by STG and 
MAC. 
Reliability issues caused scheduling delays and raised eyebrows toward the end of 
June 1960, when the qualification flight tests had been postponed by at least six 
months. Capsule system testing needed a completely new process, including 
organization, procedures, and test equipment. The top technical managers of Project 
Mercury and STG began to recognize some of their flawed thinking regarding 
reliability and admitted that quality control and reliability testing had to be raised to 
a new level. This effort targeted not only man and machine but man-rating (ensuring 
the equipment is certified safe for humans) and machine-rating (ensuring the human 
can safety operate the machine) processes as well. (This is consistent with today’s 5- 
M model, which addresses the man, machine, media. management and mission as 
part of the entire human performance equation in system approaches.) A NASA HQ 
internal note recorded some of the issues: 
One of the major problems facing Mercury management is the contlict between a 
real desire to meet schedules and the feeling of need for extensive ground tests. The 
MAC capsule systems tests are not meeting this need since they were not intended 
for this purpose and since the pressure of time sometimes forces bypassing of some 
details (to be caught later at the Cape). Further, there has not been time available (or 
taken) on the part of MAC to study and update the CST [Capsule System Test] 
procedures and SEDR’s (sic) [Service Engineering Department Report]. I t  was 
concluded that a group (mostly MAC effort) should be set up to review and update 
the CST and SEDR procedures. It is also firm that no details will be bypassed in the 
Cape checkout without the express approval of STG management (Swenson et al., 
1966. p. 258). 
Risk management was evolving at NASA. At the highest level within 
NASA, Administrator Glennan and associates recognized that the 
opportunity to make significant changes in NASA’s organization and 
procedures would not exist much longer. A report written by a consultant 
firm McKinsey and Company revealed that NASA’s record in supervising 
out-of-house efforts was spotty. Their findings highlighted that NASA had 
neglected to manage certain basic prerequisites in their oversight of the 
various contractors. NASA had failed to provide comprehensive statements 
of work, sufficient funding, ill-defined tasks, and ineffective contractor 
supervision, as well as failing to provide properly focused technical 
responsibilities-a NACA strong suit in previous DoD programs. (A basic 
problem was NASA’s tendency to establish two channels of supervision- 
one from HQ, the other from the field center. 
New Leadership 
January 1961 saw a change in the nation’s administration and a change 
at NASA HQ. President-elect Kennedy commissioned an ad hoc committee 
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on space, chaired by Jerome B. Wiesner. The press received the hastily 
prepared report with mixed reactions. 
Roscoe Drurnmond, a syndicated columnist ... charged that no Kennedy 
representative had consulted NASA to study the workings of the agency nor had any 
Kennedy official read or listened to briefings that had been prepared for the new 
leaders by outgoing Administrator Glennan and his staff. (Swenson et al., 1966, p. 
360) 
The press was also highly critical of the political transition process, 
noting that Administrator Glennan had departed from Washington on 
Inauguration Day, January 20, 1961, with no one named as a successor. In 
accordance with Washington protocol, Hugh L. Dryden had resigned as well. 
The report was tacitly adopted when President Kennedy appointed 
Jerome Wiesner Chairman of the PSAC for the new administration, although 
Aviation Week stated that President Kennedy had rejected the committee’s 
advice and decided to accept the risk if the first manned shot failed (Hotz, 
1961). This kind of executive decision with full knowledge of a formal risk 
analysis is certainly within bounds of a system safety program. However, 
Drummond fbrther charged that no persons representing the Kennedy 
administration had read or been briefed regarding the workings of NASA as 
prepared by the outgoing Administrator. This coupled with a superficial 
review of the workings of such an immense project as Project Mercury is 
insufficient to adequately allow for an informed decision and absent these 
kinds of review, accepting risk at this point appears to be more politics than 
science. 
An interesting sidebar to this political intrigue is that the Eisenhower 
administration’s last budget recommendation for manned space flight 
research and dcvelopiiieni was to cut $i9O.i miiiion from NASA’s fiscai 
1962 $1.1 billion total budget. The Bureau of the Budget in January allowed 
a total NASA request of $919.5 million, only $1 14 million of which was 
earmarked for manned space flight, including Project Mercury. Some $584 
million was requested for military astronautics within the DoD budget that 
same fiscal year. (Swenson et al., 1966) 
On February 2, 1961, Senator Robert S. Kerr, chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, presided over the 
confirmation hearings for a new NASA Administrator. James Edwin Webb, 
experienced businessman, lawyer, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and 
Under Secretary of the Department of State from 1949 to 1951, who had also 
served as a director of MAC. Armed with a resume full of bureaucratic 
qualifications, Mr. Webb certainly had a technical challenge facing him. It 
was felt that even though his background was not that of a scientist, he was 
widely known in governmental and industrial circles for having worked with 
scientists and engineers. From history’s recordings, one can feel safe in 
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presuming that during Mr. Webb’s stint at MAC he was not exposed to a 
comprehensive background in system safety management. The Senate 
confirmed Webb’s nomination after he severed all his business connections 
with MAC. 
Even as NASA struggled to launch unmanned test vehicles, it was 
apparent Project Mercury’s ends were merely a means to the greater goal of 
landing on the Moon. The funding for Project Apollo was under review in 
Congress as U.S.S.R. Major Yuri Gagarin’s flight provided a tremendous 
impetus to the desires of Americans to continue the race that was now 
officially a race. Congress appeared willing to appropriate more money than 
NASA could spend. Robert Seamans, third in command of NASA as 
Associate Administrator and general manager, actually had difficulty 
restraining the House space committee’s demands for an all-out crash 
program for a lunar landing. President Kennedy, consistent with one of his 
campaign promises, reacted to the U.S.S.R.’s manned orbit of earth by 
saying, “We are behind ... the news will be worse before it is better, and it will 
be some time before we catch up (Swenson et al., 1966, p. 336).” 
On March 9, 1961, Representative Overton Brooks wrote to President 
Kennedy regarding reports in trade journals that the space program might 
turn toward military oversight. Representative Brooks was concerned the 
Wiesner report pointed to this as he was also aware of a special PSAC 
investigating committee of scientists led by Donald F. Hornig. This 
committee was conducting a top down review of the manned space program. 
In his letter, Brooks reminded President Kennedy of the spirit and intent of 
the 1958 Space Act which was to: 
Ensure that control of space research remain in civilian hands so that resulting 
information and technological applications would be open for the benefit of all 
enterprise, both private and public. [Further,] too much information would become 
classified if the military were preeminent in space research, development, and 
exploration. (Swenson et al., 1966, p. 325) 
President Kennedy gave reassurance that NASA’s conduct of space 
exploration would not be placed subordinate to the military. For better or 
worse the marriage of the neophyte NASA management team and space 
exploration was now consummated. 
Project Mercury Lessons Learned 
Project Mercury lasted 55 months, from authorization through Gordon 
Cooper’s final MA-9 mission. The earliest planned orbital mission ran 22 
months past its originally scheduled launch date and achieved its original 
objectives (placing a man in low-earth orbit) with John Glenn’s MA-6 flight 
40 months after formal project approval. From some perspectives this was a 
good record compared to advanced missile or aircraft development 
programs, however there were critics who denied the validity of such a 
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comparison given the national priority and virtually limitless hnds made 
available for Project Mercury. 
On October 3-4, 1963, NASA and the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) 
held a gala affair in Houston, Texas, called the Mercury Summary 
Conference. They covered program management, mission performance, 
astronaut preparation, network operations, and the most recent successes of 
the MA-9 experiments. Much to NASA's chagrin, along with the official 
press releases came another document publicly released by four MSC 
engineers. They outlined procedures following delivery of the MA-9 capsule 
and necessary actions prior to launch. The authors spoke of quality assurance 
and component defects found by processes designed to prevent errant 
components from being installed in various systems. These inspections had 
produced approximately 720 system or component discrepancies; 536 
attributed to faulty workmanship, in the MA-9 mission alone! The unofficial 
engineer's release stated: 
Thousands of man-hours were expended in testing, calibration. assembly, and 
installation of a variety of hardware that later failed to meet performance 
specifications or that malfhctioned during systems tests in a simulated space 
environment.. . [Unnecessary delays could have been avoided if] adequate attention 
to detail during manufacture or thorough inspection before delivery had been 
exercised. (Swenson et al., 1966, p. 507) 
The history of Mercury spacecraft system acquisition presented a good 
object lesson in how not to manage a major program. The tone of the public 
relations coming from NASA was to attack the industry, failing to see their 
role in the oversight of those contractors. The Government Accounting 
Office was criticizing NASA and fueling attacks on the upcoming great 
lll"",,cI" ~fifi-J-ggk, as it W I ; S  i;rcvc;cnt!y beiiig ca:leb. NASA failed io ncogtiice 
exactly what had gone wrong. 
Post Project Mercury Lessons Learned 
The effort to place man in orbit required 12 prime contractors, 75 major 
subcontractors, and approximately 7,200 sub-subcontractors. NASA 
employed approximately 650 workers from STG and 710 from MSC and, 
conservatively, 18,000 DoD personnel supporting each individual Project 
Mercury mission. The scope of managing the total manpower figure of 
approximately 2,020,528 highlights the difficulties facing project managers. 
Knowing what is known today about the management techniques employed 
by NASA in this conquest it certainly becomes easy to see why the program 
ran behind schedule and over budget. 
Total cost estimates of Project Mercury, delivered in October 1963, 
show that Project Mercury "had cost $384,13 1,000 throughout the program, 
of which 37% went for the spacecraft, 33% for the tracking network, and 
24% for launch vehicle procurement" (Swenson et al., 1966, p. 508). Flight 
126 Journal of Air Transportation 
operations, research and development costs made up the remainder. The co- 
mingling of Project Mercury and Project Gemini costs during 1962 and 1963 
complicated the final cost accounting. It is generally agreed that through 
MA-9 NASA estimated the total costs of Project Mercury at roughly $400 
million, not considering the hundreds of millions spent by DoD in space 
research with NACA/NASA contracts. 
NASA engineers and physicians listed three primary lessons learned for 
manned space flight from their experience with Project Mercury. Their 
medical objectives had been fulfilled through demonstrations that human 
beings could function normally in space if adequately protected. The X-15 
missions had also demonstrated most of this knowledge. The main medical 
problems to be addressed were simple personal hygiene in flight 
Second, Project Mercury had also demonstrated that launch preparations 
were highly time consuming in an effort to ensure readiness and reliability of 
both the machines and men (the holistic system). NASA subsequently 
designed an automated digital system, Acceptance Checkout Equipment, to 
reduce human error in testing and the time required on the flight line. 
Third, mission control requirements had grown to encompass real-time 
telemetry, tracking, computing, and data display systems. Two more 
controlling agencies came into being. One was the new Mission Control 
Center at Houston. The other was the Ground Operational Support Systems, 
both new organizations reflecting the degree of complex system integration 
and automation being installed for positive ground control of future space 
flights. (Swenson et al., 1966). 
It appears that the most valuable lessons learned may have been listed in 
the other section of the report. In the internal reviews on improving their 
performance for succeeding programs, NASA management spoke of other 
valuable technological and managerial lessons from Project Mercury. In 
system design they had encountered problems with safety margins, 
redundancy, accessibility, interchangeability, and with materials whose 
behavior under unfamiliar environmental conditions had not been wholly 
predictable. Regarding qualification of systems and components, they 
believed there should be more analysis in an effort to make techniques 
conservative, complete, integrated, and functional. Fabrication and 
inspection standards carried over from development into manufacturing 
work should be made still more rigorous, detailed, current, and enforced. 
Engineers called for continuous upgrading of tests, inspections, and other 
validation procedures, particularly with respect to interface compatibilities 
between systems. In configuration control, NASA developers recognized 
weight control problems and their need to become more responsive and 
aware of leading indicators in the production and fabrication phases. The 
managers of Project Mercury now acknowledged, “that methods of 
management that had worked well enough in the first American manned 
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space project would not suit Gemini and Apollo, already in motion” 
(Swenson et al., 1966, p. 509). 
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